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The paper analyses the relationship between trade, ﬁnancial integration and business cycle synchronization
in the euro area. The introduction of the euro has had a noticeable impact on European ﬁnancial markets.
Evidence that capital market integration exerts a positive effect on output correlation has two major
implications. First, it corroborates the hypothesis of the endogeneity of optimum currency areas, whereby
after joining a monetary union countries better meet standard OCA criteria; second, it provides European
policy-makers with yet another reason to pursue ﬁnancial integration in the euro area (and in prospective
members as well).
INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the relation between trade integration, ﬁnancial integration and
the correlation of business cycles in the euro area. Since the early 1990s, measures have
been implemented to eliminate restrictions on European capital markets and increase
their amalgamation. Well functioning ﬁnancial markets facilitate the efﬁcient allocation
of resources and thereby spur economic growth; moreover, integration of capital markets
increases the risk-sharing possibilities faced by individuals and their chances to hedge
against idiosyncratic shocks. The relevance of this latter aspect has been growing with the
prospect of a European monetary union, as capital mobility is one of the standard
criteria proposed by optimum currency area (OCA) theory.
Recent empirical work (Imbs 2004) suggests that more ﬁnancially integrated
countries display more correlated business cycles. This has important implications for
the euro area, as it means that ﬁnancial integration reduces the costs of a single monetary
policy and thereby provides European policy-makers with yet another reason to purse it.
On more theoretical ground, this view supports the hypothesis that optimum currency
areas are endogenous.
The static nature of traditional OCA criteria was ﬁrst emphasized by Frankel and
Rose (1998), who assume that currency unions increase bilateral trade and ﬁnd a positive
relation between the latter and business cycle correlation. More recently, the
hypothesized effect of monetary unions on trade ﬂows has been under intense scrutiny,
stimulated by Rose (2000) who reports a very large effect.
The claim that increased commercial integration lowers the cost of a single monetary
policy through its effect on GDP synchronization therefore seems well establishedFso
much so that nowadays trade is customarily included among the determinants of GDP
correlation, as is conﬁrmed by recent work by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) and
Inklaar et al. (2005).
Thus far, research concerned with the endogenous effects of a currency union has
focused almost exclusively on the trade channel, while other possible sources of
endogeneity have not been directly explored (a notable exception being De Grauwe and
Mongelli 2005). By exploiting a number of recent empirical contributions, this paper
addresses the ﬁnancial side of the endogeneity hypothesis. The ﬁrst and foremost
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contribution of this work is the identiﬁcation of a second mechanism making a currency
area more justiﬁable ex post than ex ante. Second, building on the simultaneous
equations framework put forward by Imbs (2004), the paper accounts for the indirect
channels and interactions linking business cycle correlation, its determinants, and the
adoption of a single currency. Finally, I distinguish explicitly between sectoral
specialization and similarity of economic structuresFwhich tend to be treated as
antonyms in the existing literatureFin the belief that, at the level of disaggregation
common to this kind of analysis, they represent complementary rather than mutually
exclusive phenomena.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses in more detail the
notion of endogeneity with respect to OCA theory and provides a context for the rest of
the analysis. Section II reviews recent empirical contributions that constitute the building
blocks for my work, while Section III describes the data and the econometric
methodology employed. Results are presented in Section IV, while the ﬁnal section
discusses the main conclusions and identiﬁes some avenues for further research.
I. SOURCES OF ENDOGENEITY
Exposure to asymmetric shocks
Owing to the original use of the notion by Frankel and Rose (1998), in the context of
OCA theory endogeneity is normally taken to mean a change, triggered by the adoption
of a single currency, in the nature of the shocks faced by member countries. This in turn
alters the costs and beneﬁts associated with the surrender of monetary independence.
Frankel and Rose ﬁnd that, by enhancing trade integration, the use of a common
currency increases business cycle synchronization and thereby reduces the need to
operate exchange rate adjustments (to maintain an independent monetary policy). Of
course, this is not the only possible source of endogeneity.
A second relevant channelFwhich has not been thoroughly investigated so farFis
represented by capital markets.
International ﬁnancial integration holds a prominent place in the theory of OCA: in
his original contribution, Mundell (1961) deﬁnes the optimum domain of a monetary
union as one in which there is full mobility of factors of production. By substituting for
exchange rate movements, in fact, factor mobility has equilibrating effects in the wake of
local asymmetric shocks and reduces the costs associated with the loss of monetary
sovereignty. Ingram (1962) notes that high capital mobility can substitute for exchange
rate movements and buffer the economy from adverse temporary shocks. This notion is
further developed in Mundell (1973), where the future Nobel Prize winner discusses the
role of international risk-sharing via cross-country holding of assets.1
While these approaches suggest that, ceteris paribus, capital mobility lowers the costs
associated with permanently ﬁxing the exchange rate and losing control over monetary
policy, I recognize that the introduction of a single currency is going to have profound
effects on ﬁnancial markets and to feed back into the system.
The ﬁrst (trivial) point to note is that the elimination of exchange rate risk will sweep
away one of the main determinants of market segmentation, will increase asset
substitutability, and therefore will raise the mobility of capital. Hence the threshold level
of ex ante ﬁnancial integration required for the beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation to
outweigh associated costs is reduced by means of this process of cumulative causation.
2008] FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE EURO AREA 169
r The London School of Economics and Political Science 2007
The second channel replicates the mechanism highlighted by Frankel and Rose
(1998) in the case of trade. In fact, recent empirical ﬁndings point to the fact that
ﬁnancially integrated economies tend to display more tightly correlated cycles.
A third point, which is related to the previous one, concerns the effect of European
integration, and of monetary uniﬁcation in particular, on sectoral specialization patterns.
Most models in international trade theory predict that a reduction in transaction costs
induces specialization, in order to exploit comparative advantages (Ricardian theory),
factor abundance (Heckscher–Ohlin model) and economies of scale (new trade theory) or
of location (new economic geography). A similar conclusion holds for ﬁnancial
integration and follows from the risk-sharing argument reviewed above: capital market
integrationFallowing for cross-border ownership of assets and means of productionF
relaxes the trade-off between specialization and the insurance properties of a diversiﬁed
portfolio of industrial sectors. While concentrating on more productive sectors grants
higher returns, it makes the system more exposed to asymmetric shocks; ﬁnancial
integration would provide agents with better insurance against (non-systemic) produc-
tion risk and therefore enhance specialization.
Most studies investigating the impact of European (monetary) integration on
national industrial structures assume that more specialized economies display less
synchronized cycles: yet this is not necessarily true, at least on theoretical grounds.
Obstfeld (1994), for instance, sets up an open-economy model whereby international
ﬁnancial integration encourages all countries to shift away from a low-return, safe
investment to a high-yielding, risky one. The same could happen once capital market
integration allows ﬁrms that operate in risky sectors, and are therefore more dependent
on external ﬁnance, to have a wider access to ﬁnancial funds. In this case European
countries would experience simultaneously both increased specialization and increased
similarity of their industrial structure as those sectors experience a generalized growth.
So far I have discussed endogeneity in the sense of a feedback loop from monetary
integration to business cycle correlation, and I have identiﬁed three main channels
through which this can occur: trade integration, ﬁnancial integration and industrial
specialization. Although this notion of endogeneity is the most common in the context of
OCA theoryFand it is the one to which I will refer throughout the rest of the
paperFthese are not the only mechanisms by which the decision to surrender exchange
rate independence may affect ex post the costs and beneﬁts of monetary uniﬁcation.
Transmission of shocks and policy responses
Exposure to asymmetric shocks may not be the sole reason why members of a currency
union are out of phase. Farina and Tamborini (2004), for instance, present an interesting
model where, given the institutional design of EMU, the main culprit lies in the presence
of structural asymmetries.2
Aside from the trivial case of asymmetries in the propagation of the shocks (which is
tantamount to the presence of asymmetric shocks), there may be differences in the
transmission of the common monetary policy. The budgetary limits imposed upon ﬁscal
authorities entail that automatic stabilizers alone are not able to fully stabilize the
economy, so that some residual volatility is transmitted to the whole monetary union and
will trigger central bank intervention. Then, as a result of different transmission
mechanisms, the common monetary policy will not ﬁt all countries and may even
generate ‘perverse’ outcomes whereby cross-country dispersion of output gaps increases.3
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The last reason to believe that monetary integration may affect the response of the
economy to shocks is its potential effect on monetary policy transmission mechanisms.
Deeper ﬁnancial integration is likely to have an impact on the institutional and legal
framework governing ﬁnancial ﬂows, the functioning of ﬁnancial markets and the
transmission of policy impulses. Using Farina and Tamborini’s terminology, one can
imagine that, via its effect on ﬁnancial market integration, the introduction of a single
currency would reduce the structural asymmetries that tend to cause ‘perverse’ effects.
The main difference between the ‘endogeneities’ described in the previous section and
those reviewed here lies in the fact that the latter originate from the interaction between
the adoption of a single currency and the institutional design regulating the functioning
of a particular currency area. On the contrary, one can regard the former as having a
more general content and applying to every monetary union. For this reason, in what
follows I shall focus exclusively on the ﬁrst type of endogenous effects: the feedback loop
from monetary integration to business cycle correlation, placing particular emphasis on
the role of ﬁnancial integration.
II. A GLANCE AT THE EXISTING LITERATURE
Relevant contributions can be classiﬁed in two broad families according to their main
focus: (i) the impact of EMU on European capital markets and (ii) determinants of
output correlation and the role of ﬁnancial integration.
European capital markets after the euro
The elimination of exchange rate risk enhances substitutability among securities issued in
different countries, and increases transparency. This in turn facilitates competition and
arbitrage and thus reduces the cross-sectional dispersion of prices and returns. Moreover,
using a single unit of account removes currency matching requirements for ﬁnancial
intermediaries and therefore fosters cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows. There is a wide
consensus on the notion that the introduction of the single currency has spurred ﬁnancial
integration in the euro area both directly (through the elimination of currency risk and
the standardization of contracts) and indirectly (by reducing the cost of cross-country
transactions and increasing competition in the banking sector).
In two early studies, Galati and Tsatsaronis (2001) and Karlinger (2002) claim that
the euro contributed to a reduction in the ﬁnancial market segmentation by relaxing
technical, regulatory and psychological constraints that had been hindering integration
until 1999.
A comprehensive assessment of the impact of EMU on ﬁnancial markets is presented
by Baele et al. (2004): they ﬁnd that, although the impact of the single currency has been
particularly quick and pronounced on bond markets (see also Hartman et al. 2003;
Pagano and von Thadden 2004; Cappiello et al. 2006), all market sectors have shown a
marked increase in integration.
Additional indirect evidence is provided by those studies that investigate the nature
of remaining spreads among government bond yields. They ﬁnd little role for local
factors and therefore dismiss explanations based on liquidity risk and residual market
segmentation (Codogno et al. 2003; Pagano and von Thadden 2004). Greater integration
is also suggested by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), who ﬁnd that the correlation
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between domestic saving and investment has declined over time, especially in the euro
area.
In a more recent contribution, De Santis and Ge´rard (2006) ﬁnd that the single
currency has enhanced regional ﬁnancial integration above and beyond the global trend.
Integration, specialization and output correlation
The relation between integration and business cycle synchronization is not clear-cut.
Advocates of the specialization paradigm (Krugman 1993) claim that the former fosters
specialization and therefore makes countries less synchronized. Early studies on the issue
have tried to asses the impact of European integration on the industrial structure of
member countries. Most empirical contributions, however, predate EMU and focus on
the integration of real, rather than ﬁnancial, markets.
This being said, it is worth noting that no well deﬁned implications emerge from the
data, as results appear to be sensitive to the level of regional disaggregation (Martin
2001) and to the variable chosen to measure sectoral activity: Bru¨lhart (2001) reports
different ﬁndings for trade, production and employment data. Bru¨lhart and Traeger
(2005) ﬁnd little support for the hypothesis that strong sectoral reallocation trends across
economic activities have taken place between 1975 and 2000. Midelfart et al. (2003)
conclude that, while monetary uniﬁcation increases specialization, the size and relevance
of industry-speciﬁc shock is very small and does not raise the cost of monetary policy.
Following Frankel and Rose (1998), a number of studies have focused on the relation
between trade and output correlation. For instance, recent work by Inklaar et al. (2005)
ﬁnds support for the role of bilateral trade intensity, although the authors stress that
other factors (policy coordination, specialization, ﬁnancial integration) are equally
important. Along the same lines, Otto et al. (2001) conﬁrm (i) an important role for
trade, and (ii) a less robust performance by ﬁnance (whose signiﬁcance depends on the
chosen measure), while (iii) policy coordination and specialization patterns are not
signiﬁcant. Similar results can be found in Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), while Fidrmuc
(2004) stresses that it is intra-industry trade that drives synchronization.
Yet there are also some dissenting voices: Doyle and Faust (2003) show that, despite
the large increase in economic integration experienced by G7 countries, there is no
evidence of a signiﬁcant shift in correlations; while Camacho et al. (2005) ﬁnd that
international economies have become less synchronized over the last ﬁfteen years.
Alesina et al. (2002) claim that currency unions do not bring about co-movements in
output (as opposed to Rose and Engel, 2002); moreover, it is not clear whether a
European business cycle has emerged as a result of increased integration (Artis and
Zhang 1997; Artis 2003; Giannone and Reichlin 2006).
For what concerns more speciﬁcally ﬁnancial integration, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001,
2003) provide empirical support for the hypothesis that ﬁnancial integration, by
promoting specialization, is conducive to less synchronized cycles. These ﬁndings clash
with the conclusions reached by Rose and Engel (2002) and Darvas and Szapa´ry (2004).
Using a simultaneous equation framework that accounts for the interactions between
trade, ﬁnance, industrial specialization and output co-movements, Imbs (2004) notes that
ﬁnancially integrated economies are more synchronized despite the fact that they are also
more specialized.
There are two ways to reconcile these opposite claims. First, ﬁnancial integration
raises risk-sharing (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2003) and therefore smooths the effects of
asymmetric shocks. Whether the insurance provided by the international cross-holding of
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assets and liabilities is enough to offset the increased number of shocks provoked by
specialization is an open empirical question. Second, the link between ﬁnancial
integration and specialization is not unambiguously determined, as countries may well
specialize in similar sectors characterized by a greater reliance on external ﬁnance
(Obstfeld 1994; Rajan and Zingales 1998).
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This paper pursues two different methodologies in order to identify the role of ﬁnancial
integration in determining output correlation.
First, I use single-equation estimation to gauge the effects of trade, ﬁnance,
specialization and similarity of industrial structure on GDP co-movements. Following
Otto et al. (2001), I move from simple to complex and start from a bivariate speciﬁcation
where business cycle synchronization is regressed on each of the explanatory variables in
turn. This approach limits colinearity problems but clearly pays a high price in terms of
explanatory power, and the results give only a coarse representation of the relation of
interest. Multivariate regressions are then presented and discussed, from which it is
possible to derive a more complete picture.
The second step exploits the simultaneous equation approach suggested by Imbs
(2004), which grants one the possibility of more adequately investigating the complex
system of interactions among trade, ﬁnance, specialization and synchronization. In its
original speciﬁcation, the system of simultaneous equations read as follows:
ð1Þ r ¼ a0 þ a1F þ a2T þ a3S;
ð2Þ F ¼ b0 þ b1XF ;
ð3Þ T ¼ g0 þ g1S þ g2XT ;
ð4Þ S ¼ d0 þ d1F þ d2T þ d3XS;
where r measures output correlation, F ﬁnancial integration, T bilateral trade ﬂows and
S sectoral similarity, and where Xn are additional controls needed to achieve
identiﬁcation.
While Imbs (2004) used a pure cross-sectional data-set, I adopt a panel approach and
investigate the behaviour of 190 country pairs over the period 1991–2002.4 To acquire a
meaningful measure of GDP correlation, the 12 years have been divided into three
subperiods of four years each, and quarterly real GDP data (taken from the OECDMain
Economic Indicators) are used to compute synchronization.
Three measures of business cycle synchronization are employed: (i) the correlation
between GDP series ﬁltered via a band-pass ﬁlter a` la Baxter and King (1999); (ii) the
correlation between fourth-lag log-differences; and (iii) a measure based on the
innovations from an AR(2) process as used in Alesina et al. (2002). In the regression
analysis the ﬁrst two indicators are further transformed to account for the fact that
sample correlations must lie between 1 and 1 (see the Appendix for details).
Trade data come from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, and bilateral trade
intensity is measured as the sum of imports and exports weighted by the sum of GDPs:
Tij ¼
expij þimpij
GDPi þ GDPj :
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As opposed to Imbs (2004), who opts for quantity-based measures, I used price-based
indicators to measure ﬁnancial integration. In this choice I was backed by a number of
authors. Adam et al. (2002) suggest that indicators based on price data dominate those
based on quantities in terms of accuracy and moreover grant a clear-cut interpretation.
Goldberg et al. (2003) state that real interest rate equalization is the broadest and most
theoretically appealing measure of ﬁnancial integration, as it refers to the law of one
price. Baele et al. (2004) agree with such a claim, but advocate the use of nominal rather
than real yields, motivating the choice by noting that otherwise one conducts a joint test
of ﬁnancial integration and purchasing power parity. In addition, local factors (like
inﬂation) should not be relevant in integrated markets unless inﬂation is related to credit
risk. I therefore used nominal interest rates as well.
I deﬁne ﬁnancial integration as the Euclidean distance between the spread among
long- and short-term interest rates reported by the OECD:
F1ij ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðliri  lirjÞ2þðsiri  sirjÞ2
q
;
where lir and sir are the long- and short-term interest rates, and i and j label different
countries. This measure is based on the recognition that ﬁnancial integration is a multi-
faceted phenomenon, so that focusing on a single aspect (a single market segment) may
produce a distorted picture. More speciﬁcally, different risk premia entail the presence of
persistent spreads among government bond yields (and all long-term rates) also in
presence of perfectly integrated capital markets: indeed, spreads may signal well
functioning ﬁnancial markets that are able to discriminate among different issuers. On
the other hand, as the money market is more readily affected by the institutional changes
brought about by EMU, short-term rates run the risk of presenting too strong an effect
of monetary integration. This is because the emergence of a single reference rate for
reﬁnancing operations (that established by the ECB) generates a sort of ‘mechanical
convergence’ in those market segments that are more heavily dependent on it. Using a
combination of interest rates instead of a single one helps to limit the aforementioned
effects and should provide one with a cleaner picture of capital market integration.
Similarity and specialization are computed from employment data for 27 sectors
taken from the OECD Stan database. Sectoral similarity is measured as the sum over all
sectors of the difference between the sector’s share on total employment in countries i
and j:
Sij ¼
X
k
shareik  sharejk
 ;
where k represents sectors. In addition, I built a measure for specialization given by the
pairwise product of the Herﬁndahl indexes for the two economies.
Estimation of the system is performed using the error component 2SLS (EC2SLS)
procedure suggested by Baltagi (2001). Despite the fact that 2SLS is a limited
information method and therefore pays a price in terms of efﬁciency, in a Monte Carlo
study Baltagi (1984) shows that the efﬁciency gain associated with EC3SLS is not large
enough to justify the computational effort, while using the standard 3SLS estimatorF
which exploits all the available information, but disregards the panel structure of the
dataFyields inferior results.
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Table 1 presents the correlation among relevant variables (boldface indicates signiﬁcance
at 5% level). The synchronization measure is that obtained using the band-pass ﬁlter.
The signs of the coefﬁcients support my maintained hypotheses (I measured lack of
ﬁnancial integration and structural similarity): there is a positive relation between trade
and synchronization and between trade and ﬁnancial integration. More important, the
latter is positively related to GDP correlation.
Figure 1 provides some intuition of the phenomena under scrutiny by illustrating the
developments of the relevant variables. Each panel distinguishes three groups of country-
pairs: those in which both countries are (or later became) EMU members, those in which
only one of them belongs to the EMU group; and those in which both countries belong
to the rest of the world. Country-pairs are weighted by PPP-adjusted GDP to yield group
averages, which are then plotted and displayed in the ﬁve panels.
TABLE 1
Pairwise Correlation Matrixa
synchr trade ﬁnance struct spec
synchr 1.000
trade 0.241 1.000
ﬁnance  0.244  0.262 1.000
struct  0.273  0.389 0.298 1.000
spec  0.187  0.175 0.140 0.047 1.000
aBoldface indicates signiﬁcance at 5%.
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Measures of business cycle correlation and trade integration are always larger for
EMU members, witnessing to the long integration effort that predated monetary
uniﬁcation. More interestingly, and consistently with our focus on capital markets,
ﬁnancial integration appears to have increased very rapidly in EMU, starting just before
the formal inception of the monetary union. Finally, EMU countries display on average
a more similar industrial structure and are less specialized.
This pictorial evidence is conﬁrmed by Table 2, which displays summary statistics.
Comparing EMU members (panel a) with the rest of the sample (panel b), one can see
that the former on average are more synchronized, experience larger trade ﬂows and have
smaller interest rate spreads. With respect to this last point, it is interesting to note that
not only is the interest rate spread lower on average, but there is also much less variability
(standard deviation drops from 2.55 to 0.61). The behaviour of specialization and
structural similarity is less clear-cut: euro area countries seem to be slightly more similar
and less specialized.
One may argue that the different behaviour of the two subsamples is the effect of a
common worldwide trend rather than of the EMU in itself. Therefore panel (c) reports
summary statistics for non-member countries limiting the analysis to the period 1999–
2003. The resulting picture is qualitatively very similar to the previous one: interestingly,
the case for a ‘euro effect’ seems even stronger. Output synchronization is the only
variable for which the distinction between members and non-members of a currency
union is smaller than in panel (a). On the contrary, for trade, ﬁnance, sectoral similarity
and specialization, the difference grows larger. These results may be expected for trade
and ﬁnance, as monetary unions are likely to involve large trading partners and/or
economic systems that are already well integrated, while for what concerns similarity and
specialization they stand witness against both the specialization hypothesis and the
evidence proposed by Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001); in fact, EMU member countries
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs.
(a) CU ¼ 1Fperiod 1999–2003
synchr 0.6448 0.2541 0.1028 0.9629 45
trade 0.0112 0.0123 0.0007 0.0606 45
ﬁnance 0.4157 0.6107 0.0213 1.6987 45
struct 33.5542 9.4856 12.0050 53.8110 45
spec 615,232 65,001 525,850 794,230 45
(b) CU ¼ 0Fperiod 1991–2003
synchr 0.2844 0.5305  0.9192 0.9934 525
trade 0.0047 0.0072 0.0000 0.0685 525
ﬁnance 3.3412 2.5494 0.1686 15.3690 506
struct 33.7565 9.7029 13.4070 60.2700 335
spec 682,440 92,374 454,270 906,230 335
(c)CU ¼ 0Fperiod 1999–2003
synchr 0.4512 0.4213  0.6207 0.9934 145
trade 0.0030 0.0058 0.0000 0.0384 145
ﬁnance 2.3164 1.5853 0.3512 8.0958 145
struct 34.1257 10.5318 14.6580 58.4210 91
spec 720,809 72,392 592,570 892,240 91
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display a markedly more similar economic structure and less specialization. All this lends
credit to the endogeneity hypothesis.
Single-equation estimation
Table 3 presents results for a set of bivariate regressions that investigate the impact of
trade and ﬁnancial integration, structural similarity and specialization on the correlation
of business cycles. In this ﬁrst stage the explanatory variables are introduced separately.
Three different speciﬁcations are run for each control: (i) a simple bivariate regression,
which is then augmented with (ii) a currency union dummy and, ﬁnally, (iii) a time trend.
Results from bare-bones bivariate regressions (columns (1), (4), (7) and (10)) conﬁrm my
priors. Real and ﬁnancial integration have a positive impact on output correlation, as
does similarity of industrial structures; conversely, more specialized countries tend to be
less synchronized. This evidence supports the idea that capital market integration fosters
cycle correlation, contrary to what is customarily assumed.
In columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) a currency union dummy is added to the regression.
While the estimated coefﬁcients of the main variables are robust to this change, the
behaviour of the currency union dummy is rather volatile: negative and not signiﬁcant in
the case of ﬁnance, it turns positive and signiﬁcant in the other cases, moving to rather
large numbers. This conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), i.e. that
currency unions cannot be included among the robust determinants of business cycle
correlation.
This last consideration is further corroborated when, to better evaluate the effect of
EMU, a time trend is included (columns (3), (6), (9) and (12): the coefﬁcient of the time
trend is not shown). The coefﬁcient of the currency union dummy loses signiﬁcance in all
instances, and becomes not statistically different from zero in the trade regression
(column (3)). Estimated coefﬁcients of other controls do not change.5
Before moving to multivariate analysis, I must emphasize that the lack of a direct
relation between monetary integration and business cycle correlation does not work
against my maintained hypothesis. The endogeneity argument does not in fact state that
by joining a currency union a country will become more synchronized with its fellow
countries, but rather that the likely increase in trade and ﬁnancial integration brought
about by the use of a single currency will have an effect also on output correlation. It is
indeed this indirect effect that makes OCA endogenous.
The speciﬁcation for multivariate regression analysis is the simple juxtaposition of all
possible determinants of business cycle correlation encountered so far:
ð5Þ synchrijt ¼ a0 þ a1tradeijt þ a2financeijt þ a3specijt þ a4structijt þ a5EMUijt þ eijt:
Once again, I have used different speciﬁcations augmenting the basic regression
equation with an EMU dummy, time dummies and a time trend. Results are summarized
in Table 4 and largely conﬁrm what bivariate regressions suggest: the currency union
indicator is not robust to changes in the structure of the estimated equation, which
implies that there is not a clear, direct link between the decision to use a single currency
and output correlation. Its negative sign appears to conﬁrm Farina and Tamborini’s
hypothesis, according to which, in the presence of structural asymmetries, monetary
policy may have ‘perverse effects’ and lead to increased output dispersion.
Trade, ﬁnance and structural similarity have a positive impact on business cycle
synchronization. The specialization measure (the pairwise product of the Herﬁndahl
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index) has the expected negative sign but is not signiﬁcant at 5%. These conclusions are
robust to the inclusion of period dummies and of a time trend (columns (3) and (4)).
Robustness is tested using alternative measures for cycle synchronization and
ﬁnancial integration, the two variables on which our attention is concentrated.
Estimation results in Table 5 tell that what has been claimed so far does not hinge
upon a particular way of measuring GDP linkages. Columns (1) and (2) are derived using
bilateral correlations between the fourth differences of the log of real GDP, and results
are very similar to those in Table 4. Even when I chose a radically different measure, such
as the one proposed by Alesina et al. (2002) and used in columns (3) and (4), qualitative
conclusions do not change.6 If possible, these results are even more convincing, as all
coefﬁcientsFapart from the EMU dummyFare signiﬁcantly different from zero, have
the expected sign, and therefore conﬁrm our priors and agree with most of the existing
literature.
In Table 6 I tested for the robustness of results to different measures of ﬁnancial
integration. First, in columns (1) and (2), I used lagged values of F1 to account for
potential endogeneity and found no signiﬁcant difference. The effect of trade and ﬁnance
is conﬁrmed, while structural variables such as sectoral similarity and specialization lose
signiﬁcance.7
Next, I built a second measure of distance from the law of one price starting from
government bond yields and bank lending rates: this index (F2) is appealing because the
two rates span separate (‘orthogonal’) markets and therefore give a more complete
picture of capital market integration.8 As before, both trade and ﬁnancial integration
appear to exert a positive inﬂuence on output correlation; sectoral similarity and
specialization lose signiﬁcance although they display the correct sign; and the behaviour
of the currency union dummy continues to be not robust to different speciﬁcations.
TABLE 4
Multivariate Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade 0.170 0.174 0.272 0.189
(2.93)nn (3.00)nn (4.74)nn (3.24)nn
ﬁnance  0.385  0.430  0.281  0.372
(6.30)nn (5.22)nn (3.42)nn (4.33)nn
spec  0.504  0.526  0.977  0.815
(0.95) (0.99) (1.86) (1.50)
struct  0.615  0.570  0.411  0.611
(2.41)n (2.18)n (1.63) (2.35)n
EMU  0.234  0.755  0.366
(0.81) (2.69)nn (1.25)
Time dummies No No Yes No
Time trend No No No Yes
Observations 380 380 380 380
R2 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.24
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis.
nSigniﬁcant at 5%; nnSigniﬁcant at 1%.
Constant, trend and time trend not reported.
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Although interest rate convergence has a clear-cut interpretation in terms of the law
of one price, it may reﬂect a global phenomenon trend rather than a EMU-speciﬁc
phenomenon. Therefore, in order to approach capital market integration from a different
perspective, the last two columns of Table 6 report results obtained using a measure of
ﬁnancial integration based on the bilateral correlations of stock market returns.9
Interestingly, capital market integration retains its positive effect on business cycle
synchronization while other control variables are not affected.
At this point I can summarize a ﬁrst set of results. My analysis points towards a
robust effect of capital market integration on output correlation; this adds to the already
established channel working through trade, whose existence and relevance is conﬁrmed
here as well. The role of structural similarity and specialization is less clear-cut, probably
because these are slow-moving structural factors whose impact is difﬁcult to distinguish
at business cycle frequencies. Still, the intuition that more similar economies are hit by
symmetric shocks and therefore display more correlated cycles, while economic systems
that are very specialized tend to move less together ﬁnds some support. Regression
results do not highlight any robust direct ‘euro effect’. Consistent with what is reported
by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004), the coefﬁcients of the currency union dummy are
sensitive to different speciﬁcations, and even when signiﬁcantly different from zero they
change both sign and magnitude.
System estimation
To better address the role of EMU, I turn now to the simultaneous-equation framework
ﬁrst proposed by Imbs (2004), and capable of accounting for the interactions between
key variables. This is particularly important in the present context, because my main
TABLE 5
Robustness: Alternative Synchronization Measures
4th quarter difference AR(2) process
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trade 0.155 0.167  0.001  0.001
(3.42)nn (3.66)nn (2.57)n (3.69)nn
ﬁnance  0.373  0.325 0.002 0.001
(5.95)nn (4.95)nn (4.69)nn (2.13)n
struct  0.436  0.467 0.002 0.003
(2.14)n (2.29)n (1.70) (2.00)n
spec 0.422 0.183  0.015  0.009
(1.02) (0.43) (5.22)nn (3.36)nn
EMU  0.246  0.339 0.002 0.004
(1.13) (1.54) (1.59) (2.82)nn
Time trend No Yes No Yes
Observations 380 380 380 380
R2 0.25 0.26 0.003 0.003
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis.
nSigniﬁcant at 5%; nnSigniﬁcant at 1%.
Constant and trend not reported.
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hypothesis entails an indirect effect of monetary uniﬁcation on synchronization working
through ﬁnancial integration. The system allowed me to uncover such indirect effects,
and therefore represents the most appropriate way to test the endogeneity hypothesis.
For instance, we have seen above that economic theory does not unambiguously
determine the impact of ﬁnancial integration on GDP correlation. The simultaneous
equations make it possible to see whether or not trade and ﬁnancial integration really
trigger specialization and thus drive economic systems further apart.
Table 7 displays results of EC2SLS estimation of the original system as speciﬁed in
equations (1)–(4) above. A few minor modiﬁcations are needed to comply with the panel
structure of our data-set and to match the priors of the paper. I introduce an EMU
dummy in all the equations and instrument ﬁnance using its own lags. (The institutional
variables used by Imbs (2004) are time invariant.) Results are similar to those reported in
the original paper (Imbs 2004, table 4): in particular, trade and ﬁnancial integration both
affect output correlation positively, as does a similar industrial structure (though its
coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant). This in turn implies larger trade linkages and testiﬁes to the
importance of intra-industry trade. The main difference with Imbs’s results lies in the sign
(and signiﬁcance) of the ﬁnance coefﬁcient in column (3): I found no evidence for ﬁnance-
induced specialization in different sectors. On the contrary, there seems to be a positive
link between capital-market integration and similarity of industrial structures.
This last result offers support for the idea that greater/better access to international
ﬁnancial markets, by offering a wider range of risk-sharing instruments, allows countries
to undertake similar patterns of specialization in risky, and therefore more ﬁnancially
demanding, activities.
TABLE 6
Robustness: Alternative Financial Integration Measures
Lagged F1 F2w Stock market corr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trade 0.203 0.225 0.240 0.294 0.15 0.201
(3.37)nn (3.74)nn (2.91)nn (3.72)nn (2.27)n (2.74)nn
ﬁnance  0.318  0.239  0.434  0.259 0.809 0.619
(3.47)nn (2.51)n (3.38)nn (2.04)n (3.94)nn (2.63)nn
struct  0.331  0.397 0.027  0.357 0.252 0.368
(1.19) (1.43) (0.06) (0.85) (0.61) (0.87)
spec  0.795  1.082  0.261  0.987  0.005  0.047
(1.46) (1.97)n (0.35) (1.37) (0.04) (0.37)
EMU 0.581 0.278 0.695 0.034 0.685 0.522
(2.68)nn (1.15) (2.35)n (0.11) (2.75)nn (1.95)
Time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 363 363 205 205 347 347
R2 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.19 0.19
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis.
nSigniﬁcant at 5%; nnSigniﬁcant at 1%.
Constant and trend not reported.
wF2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðgi  gjÞ2 þ ðbi  bjÞ2
q
, g government bond yield and b bank lending rate.
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To better investigate this link, I slightly modify the structure of the system and
explicitly distinguish specialization and structural similarity. Both Imbs (2004) and the
vast majority of studies that deal with specialization patterns in Europe tend to assume
that specialization necessarily implies less similar economic structure. This paper
challenges that belief by adopting separate measures for specialization and structural
similarity, as has already been done in the context of multivariate, single-equation
estimation. Equation (5) thus becomes the ﬁrst line in our modiﬁed system, where
subscripts have been omitted for the sake of simplicity:
ð6Þ synchr ¼ a0 þ a1tradeþ a2financeþ a3specþ a4structþ a5EMU þ e1
ð7Þ trade ¼ b0 þ b1financeþ b2specþ b3structþ b4EMU þ X2 þ e2
ð8Þ finance ¼ g0 þ g1tradeþ g2EMU þ X3 þ e3
ð9Þ spec ¼ d0 þ d1tradeþ d2financeþ d3EMU þ X4 þ e4
ð10Þ struct ¼ f0 þ f1financeþ f2specþ f3EMU þ e5:
Equation (7) postulates that trade is explained by ﬁnance (trade credit offers a simple
justiﬁcation for this), specialization and sectoral similarity, which command inter- and
intra-industry trade, respectively. X2 is a set of exogenous determinants containing
gravity variables (GDP, distance, common language and number of landlocked countries
in the pair: these data are taken from Andrew Rose’s website). Financial integration
depends on trade linkages (equation (8)): the rationale behind this idea is the model
presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), where the authors show how small frictions in
goods markets may explain some of the most relevant ‘puzzles’ in the functioning of
international capital markets. The predetermined variables X3 are ﬁnance own-lags.
Equation (9) replicates Imbs’s (2004) speciﬁcation and states that sectoral specialization
TABLE 7
Simultaneous Equations: Imbs Specification
(1) (2) (3)
synchr trade struct
trade 0.203  0.094
(3.54)nn (6.11)nn
ﬁnance  0.668 0.066
(4.60)nn (3.16)nn
struct  0.216  2.632
(0.79) (7.79)nn
EMU  0.82 0.074 0.186
(2.06)n (1.13) (3.20)nn
Observations 363 380 363
R2 0.18 0.76 0.25
Notes:
Equation-by-equation EC2SLS.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parenthesis.
nSigniﬁcant at 5%; nnSigniﬁcant at 1%.
Constant and gravity variables not reported.
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is driven by trade and ﬁnancial integration plus the pairwise product and ratio of GDP
per capita. (The latter two controls are subsumed by X4.) The last equation establishes a
link between specialization and similarity of industrial structures and therefore
formalizes the hypothesis that specialization may occur in similar sectors.
Exogenous determinants included in X2X4 serve the double purpose of identifying
the system and tackling the simultaneous-equation bias arising from the use of
endogenous regressors. Hence, whenever one of the ﬁve left-hand-side variables enters
the system as a regressorFlike trade in equations (6), (8) or (10)Fit is instrumented by
its exogenous determinants (gravity variables, in the case of trade).
Each column of Table 8 represents one equation of the system, while relevant
controls are on rows (exogenous determinants are not reported). Column (1) conﬁrms
results of multivariate regression analysis (Tables 4–6 above) and therefore does not
require a detailed discussion: let me note that the coefﬁcient of structural similarity loses
signiﬁcance but keeps the expected sign (low values of struct are associated with higher
correlation), while specialization is again negative but not signiﬁcant. The EMU dummy
is negative, rather large and signiﬁcant: I interpret this as conﬁrming the existence of
‘perverse effects’ of the common monetary policy a` la Farina and Tamborini (2004).
Estimation of equation (7) yields the results reported in column (2): the currency
union dummy as well as gravity variables (not shown) have the expected sign; both
sectoral specialization and structural diversity have a negative sign, which suggests the
prevalence of intra-industry over inter-industry trade. These estimated coefﬁcients in fact
tell us that more specialized countries tend to trade lessFwhile, conversely, economies
with a similar industrial structure enjoy large commercial ﬂows. Financial integration
appears not to play a relevant role in determining trade linkages, but this is little wonder
as the latter usually predate the former.
Column (3) conﬁrms my intuition and suggests both that EMU has had a relevant
impact on ﬁnancial integration inside the euro area, and that trade relations facilitate
capital market harmonization.10
Results for equation (9) yield contrasting signals: while in fact there is no sign of
trade-induced specializationFon the contrary, deeper commercial links are associated
with lower values for the product of Herﬁndahl indexesFﬁnancial integration seems to
enhance specialization, as has been documented in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003).
Equation (10) should tell us whether the specialization triggered by international
capital market integration occurs in similar (risky) sectors or results in countries having
less similar industrial structures. Estimates in column (5) seem to support the idea that
countries specialize in similar sectors; in fact, more specialization is associated with lower
structural diversity. Yet the very low value of the R2 (very low even for the standards of
panel regression models) suggests caution when interpreting these results.
The second set of results reported in Table 8 has been obtained using sectoral stock
market capitalization data to compute specialization and structural similarity;
furthermore, I refer to stock market correlation when measuring ﬁnancial integration.11
This latter change implies that the expected sign of the coefﬁcient for ﬁnance is now
positive.
Estimated coefﬁcients for trade and ﬁnancial integration in equation (6) are in line
with my maintained hypothesis. Structural variables change sign, but remain not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. The same applies to the EMU dummy, which becomes
positive and not signiﬁcant. The impression that specialization, similarity of industrial
structures and monetary integration do not have a clear-cut, direct effect on
synchronization is therefore conﬁrmed.
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One observes some relevant changes in column (2): ﬁrst, the coefﬁcient of ﬁnancial
integration becomes signiﬁcantly different from zero and therefore establishes a link
between this variable and trade ﬂows; second, structural similarity changes sign and turns
positive, suggesting that more diverse economic systems tend to have closer commercial
contacts. This reverses my previous result and can be explained by Ricardian trade
theory and comparative advantages.
Results in column (8) are qualitatively equal to those obtained previously. Moving to
equation (9), any sign of ﬁnance-induced specialization disappears as this time ﬁnancial
integration exerts a negative effect on specialization. This change in the behaviour of
variables connected with the structure of the economy is conﬁrmed in column (10), where
the effect of specialization on the similarity of economic structures becomes not
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Interestingly, though, the behaviour of the EMU
dummy in the last two columns of the table supports the idea that monetary integration
makes countries more similar as well as more specialized.
To summarize, results from the simultaneous equation approach conﬁrm the
existence of an endogenous effect linking the use of a single currency with the
synchronization of business cycles and working through capital market integration. This
indirect effect is given by [g2  a2] and makes the pair with the trade channel identiﬁed by
Frankel and Rose (1998), which amounts to [b4  a1].12 Our estimates imply that, starting
from the mean values for the EMU group before 1999, reducing F1 by 50% results in an
increase in output correlation of 0.10.
I was less successful in determining the relation between ﬁnancial integration and
sectoral dynamics. Data and empirical analysis do not in fact offer a clear-cut picture of
the relation between the adoption of a single currency, capital market integration and
sectoral specialization patterns.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have investigated the relation between ﬁnancial integration and output
correlation in the context of OCA theory. I found robust and consistent evidence that
monetary integration enhances capital market integration, which in turn feeds back into
the system and results in closer business cycle synchronization. This mechanism adds to
the trade channel highlighted by Frankel and Rose (1998), lends credit to the hypothesis
that countries are better candidates to join a monetary union ex post rather than ex ante,
and represents the main contribution of the paper.
More work is needed to understand fully the determinants of the relation between
these two variables. One possibilityFthe hypothesis that capital market integration
triggers specialization in similar sectorsFﬁnds some support in the data, but empirical
evidence is far from conclusive.
The implication of these ﬁndings for European policy-making are important and far-
reaching. The debate on the pros and cons of EMU participation, especially in opt-out
countries and new EU members, obviously beneﬁts from a wider and deeper
understanding of the forces set in motion by monetary integration. Moreover, the
emphasis placed by European institutions on the harmonization and integration of goods
and capital markets seems well placed. In fact, through its effects on the co-movement of
macroeconomic variables, closer integration is not only beneﬁcial to consumers, but may
also facilitate the task of euro area policy-makers.
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APPENDIX
Measures of output synchronization based on bilateral correlation are transformed before entering
the regression analysis. This is done to account for the fact that sample correlations must lie
between  1 and 1, while independent variables span the whole real line. This is likely to have
adverse effects in the estimation of a model of the form
ðA1Þ r ¼ a logðxÞ þ e:
This problem is ﬁrst recognized by Otto et al. (2001), whichFto my knowledgeFremains the only
work to tackle the issue.
Following the transformation proposed there, the dependent variable becomes
ðA2Þ ~r ¼ log rþ 1
1 r
 
;
~r now spans the whole real line and the transformed model is
ðA3Þ ~r ¼ a logðxÞ þ e:
As a result of the transformation, the interpretation of the coefﬁcients changes slightly: while
equation (A3) implies that a 100% increase in x results in a change in ~r equal to [alog(2)], the
impact on r has a slightly more complex formulation.
Given my interest in the effect of ﬁnancial integration and the fact that F1ijt measures distance
from the law of one price, I analyzed the case in which the explanatory variable x drops from x1 to
x2 ¼ x1/2. Combining equations (A2) and (A3) and abstracting from the error term, we have
ðA4Þ ~r1 ¼ log
r1 þ 1
1 r1
 
¼ a logðx1Þ ¼ log xa1
 
ðA5Þ r1 þ 1 ¼ xa1  r1xa1
ðA6Þ r1 ¼
xa1  1
1þ xa1
:
Doing the same for x2 yields a similar expression for r2:
ðA7Þ r2 ¼
xa2  1
1þ xa2
¼ x
a
1  2a
xa1 þ 2a
:
At this point, by subtracting (A6) from (A7) we obtain the variation in r resulting from a 100%
change in x:
ðA8Þ Dr ¼ x
a
1  2a
xa1 þ 2a
 x
a
1  1
1þ xa1
¼ 2x
a
1 1 2að Þ
2a þ xa1
 
1þ xa1
  :
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NOTES
1. This argument implies that the similarity of shocks should no longer be a prerequisite for sharing a
single currency, as long as agents are insured through private ﬁnancial markets. Recent empirical studies
however, point to negligible risk-sharing achieved through this channel (Tesar 1995; Srensen and
Yosha 2000).
2. A single central bank in charge of monetary policy coupled with national ﬁscal authorities that face
binding deﬁcit ceilings.
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3. One of the key assumptions underlying Farina and Tamborini’s result is that automatic stabilizers
cannot completely offset the impact of a shock. Such an occurrence would be magniﬁed in the event that
the existence of persistent regional disparities calls for substantial public intervention, absorbs a relevant
share of national budget expenditures and, in the presence of binding deﬁcit limits, ends up reducing the
amount of resources available for stabilization purposes.
4. Countries in included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium–Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
5. When the time trend is substituted by period dummies, estimated coefﬁcients of controls do not display
any signiﬁcant change, while the EMU dummy becomes not signiﬁcant in all regressions. These results
are not reported.
6. That is an index of distance between the innovations from an AR(2) process ﬁtted to real GDP series: it
measures lack of co-movement and therefore implies that the sign of coefﬁcient must change with
respect to the previous cases.
7. Imbs (2004)Fwho uses quantity-based measures of ﬁnancial integrationFsuggests that ﬁnancial ﬂows
may be larger between less synchronized markets as this would allow for better risk-sharing. Although
this source of endogeneity works against my maintained hypothesis, and although it does not have an
immediate translation to the case of price-based measures, I prefer not to leave the question
unaddressed.
8. The lending rate is the prime rate reported by Datastream.
9. In truth, there is no compelling reason why ﬁnancially integrated economies display correlated stock
market returns. Adam et al. (2002) note that this indicator tends to be unstable in the short run and that
ex post return correlations have a questionable economic interpretation. Furthermore, this measure may
reﬂect changes in the structure of real and policy shocks. None the less, despite these limitations, it ﬁnds
widespread use in the literature.
10. EC2SLS is ill suited to deal with the presence of lagged dependent variables among the regressors in
equation (8). The appropriate econometric machinery is a dynamic panel setup enabling one to deal
with both endogenous controls and lagged dependent variables (Bond 2002). Luckily enough, the two
methodologies yield very similar results; therefore, for the sake of simplicity, Table 8 reports only
EC2SLS estimates, while the other results are available upon request.
11. Sectoral data are taken from Datastream and comprise 35 sectoral stock market indexes: the similarity
and specialization measures are derived from the share of each sectoral index over total stock market
capitalization. On the one hand, this data-set presents fewer missing observations and a ﬁner
classiﬁcation which divides the economy in a larger number of sectors. On the other, stock market
capitalization is traditionally skewed toward sectors dominated by higher returns of scale and hence
large ﬁrms; moreover, the FTSE Global Classiﬁcation System employed by Datastream gives a rather
high weight to service-based sectors whose activities entail a (more or less large) non-tradable
component.
12. The overall EMU effect would be given by a5 þ g2  a2 þ b4  a1 þ d3  a3 þ f2  a2.
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